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Abstract
We have defined a physical event as an invariant replaced structural form,
possessing a finite space-time region which emerges as a unification of the un-
certainty principle and the quantum state. To achieve this concept, we have
first unearthed and then criticized two related conjectures relying on the foun-
dation of the current physics which are that: (1) there is an operational-based
prior space-time frame in which physical events evolve continuously; and (2)
the events are understood based on a pure two-valued logic of rational-reason.
We have concluded that the presented conceptual frame supports (i) a time
operator having a domain (0, 2pi). In addition, it implies that: (ii) the dynam-
ical variables of a physical event are the functional faculties as the content of
the structural form of the event; and (iii) every physical event needs a finite
time for realization.
Keywords: Continuous kinematical and dynamical descriptions, Quantum
state, Uncertainty principle, Physical event, Structural form, Rational reason
1. Introduction
Monumental improvements in physics have usually resulted from a philo-
sophical perspective on its foundation. Interpreting the motion of physical
systems in phase-space and the idea of (the principle of) action has given rise
to analytical mechanics. A strict and robust examination of both measure-
ment and observation led A. Einstein to a new comprehension of space-time,
and thus, to the theory of special relativity; and in contrast to the prevalent
view at that time, assuming the disintegration of energy discreetly led M.
Planck to reach his formula of black body radiation, which is also the origin
of quantum theory.
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. In a similar manner, after W. Heisenberg and E. Schrödinger published
their works [1, 2, 3] on the dynamics of quantum systems, a debate about
the physical content of the Schrödinger wave function arose among physi-
cists, which again had a philosophical character and still maintains its vital-
ity. Also related to this debate, many studies have been dedicated to giving a
reasonable and satisfactory foundation to quantum mechanics, especially to
its fundamental features, such as the quantum state of a system, the measure-
ment process and the uncertainty principle [4]. When the quantum informa-
tion field emerged, these issues gained a vital importance; in particular, the
dynamic of the measurement process and the entanglement of (the quantum
state of) physical systems became cornerstones for the computations in quan-
tum circuits and quantum information respectively. Being directly related
with the measurement process of obtaining information through a quantum
circuit, the uncertainty principle has again attracted attention to itself in
the context of error-disturbance [5, 6] and entropic measurement [7, 8, 9].
In addition, the compatibility of the quantum-state assignments of parties
and the entanglement problem have highlighted the physical content of the
quantum state as a problem about the foundation of quantum information
[10, 11, 12].
. In the literature, since the works on the uncertainty principle have been
positioned from an operational (definition) perspective [13], they have un-
avoidably given rise to either a measurement based [1, 5, 6] or a statistical
interpretation of it [14, 15, 16]. Over time, as a result of these attempts, the
dynamical relation of the uncertainty principle with the quantum state has
been neglected; thus,leaving and understanding of the physical content to the
quantum state as an unresolved issue. Even if the quantum state has taken a
wider content in the scope of quantum information and computation theory,
it is still devoid of a consistent physical content such that it is considered
either as having a physical reality [17, 18] or as merely a tool showing our
lack of information about the system [19]; other works have not taken the dy-
namics of the uncertainty principle into account [20, 21, 22]. Consequently, a
consensus has not been reached on the physical content of either the quantum
state or the uncertainty principle [13]. More importantly, what is missing in
these studies is that the quantum state and the uncertainty principle have
not been considered together. In other words, the fact that both quantum
state and uncertainty principle exist within a physical event has been over-
looked. Indeed, a consideration of these two phenomena together is possible
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only if we base them on the concept of a physical event. Therefore, as the
problem of this paper, we will interpret them together based on the concept
of a physical event to obtain a physical content of them.
. In the present paper, as our main motivation, a conceptual frame of a
physical event is constructed which connects the quantum state and the un-
certainty principle physically and unifies them in a consistent interpretation.
To achieve this aim, Sec.2 first unearths and then criticizes two inveter-
ate conjectures underlying the controversial arguments about both quantum
state and uncertainty principle. One of the conjectures is that "there is
an operational-based prior space-time frame in which events evolve continu-
ously", and the other, related with the former, is that "events are understood
based on a pure two-valued logic of rational-reason". After constructing this
conceptual frame, Sec.3 presents the physical content of the quantum state
and the uncertainty principle as connected. Sec.4 summarizes the results and
discusses related subjects in the scope of the new conceptual frame, such as
the time operator and the realization of a physical event.
2. Two conjectures relying on the foundation of physics
A complete and satisfactory description of the state of a physical event,
in the classical vein, should fulfill the demanded information of what exactly
happens at any point in space at any instant of time [23]. This very exhaus-
tive statement implies a continuous description of the physical event into the
space-time domain (or frame) covered by its evolution. At the same time,
such continuity reveals a continuous causal description of that event in terms
of the related differential equation in such a way that the future-state of the
event in space-time is determined by a past-domain of space-time. Through
this causal description, whenever one asks where and when the event po-
sitions, which is the demand of its realization, it is said that it is exactly
there-place in space and there-instant in time which can be called a kinemat-
ical realization. In addition, this demand requires a continuous space-time
realization; that is, the realization of the event must be well-defined over a
continuous pattern. Hence, the realization is continuous and kinematical.
Whenever one asks what that event is, from its continuous kinematical re-
alization, the given answer is that it is, as an aggregation of matter, right
there in space-time without giving any reference to its other space-time re-
gion. Furthermore, in the first place, if this aggregation of matter has existed
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in an interval of time, it is also existent in an arbitrary portion of this inter-
val. Thus, we can say that the wholeness of a speck of matter is immune to
the division of time. In the second place, an arbitrary portion of that aggre-
gation of matter shows exactly the same dynamical and existential property
as its whole, which means an arbitrary division of the volume, so space does
not affect the characteristic property of matter [24]. Hence, the lapse of time
flows per se and space is a kind of locus for matter. This affair of matter
against space-time is indeed an implication of its continuous and kinemati-
cal realization. Summarizing this description, we want to rephrase it in two
suppositions for the sake of clarity: a continuous kinematical description of
an event in nature presupposes (i) a prior existent of space-time; and (ii) a
physical event is an amount of matter which takes place exactly right there
in space-time. One can straightforwardly infer from this perspective that an
aggregation of matter, or a physical event settles in principle into the space-
time frame independently from the dynamics of that frame. Therefore, one
always explains the dynamics of a physical event necessarily by the changes
in its position in the flow of time; thus the continuous kinematical descrip-
tion becomes the foundation of the dynamics of the event. Another, but the
most important, result is that one cannot construct from this description the
inductive or causal character of the dynamics of physical events due to both
not referring to another region of space-time and the immunity of the events
to the division of space-time. Thus, we say that the dynamics of a physical
event is conceptually unconnected to its continuous kinematical description.
Indeed, if one contemplates in light of this type of realization and describes a
physical event at every point of space-time without referring to both its past
and its future, the event stays alone on its own right into that space-time
point, and thus its dynamics is fully uncertain. On the other hand, there is
a rigid causal character of the dynamics in the language of the continuous
path equation of the event. We indeed ascribe a mere continuous dynamics
to the event by its path function such that, at every point of space-time, it
has a well-defined momentum which is continuous over the path. In addition,
the explanation of a physical event in the context of its dynamics is given
in terms of its space-time coordinates and interaction with the environment,
which is again given in term of space-time coordinates. Therefore, the de-
scription of the event from the perspective of its dynamics is constructed on
the basis of continuous space-time coordinates. As a result, regarding the ob-
server’s measurement of space-time coordinates, the kinematics of the event
is conceptually uncertain in respect to continuous dynamics of the event,
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because it is impossible for the observer to say that the event is right there
in space-time so long as it is evolving continuously. It is surprisingly seen
that there is a mutually exclusive relation between the continuous kinemat-
ical description and the continuous dynamical description. Throughout this
classical description, on one side, there is motion or the field of the inter-
action as an event, and on the other side, there is space-time as a stage.
However, when relativity theory is taken into account, the description must
be changed in some manner. According to (special or general) relativity the-
ory, space-time has a relational character and takes its shape according to
the distribution of matter through it. It is essential to emphasize that the
revolution from the absolute to the relational conception of space-time is a
consequence of the operational definition [25]. Another remarkable implica-
tion of the theory is that the matter is not an additional something, say a
substance, existing in space-time. Indeed, as can be seen from the definition
of the differential interval of two space-time events, ds2 = guvdxudxv, the
metric tensor of the gravitational field underwrites the conception of both
length and time-interval of a physical event. Therefore, by taking into ac-
count the operational definition of space-time, one can conclude that matter
does not have a meaning in its own right without the geometrical structure
of space-time. It can be thus inferred that neither matter nor space-time
has a privileged and per se meaning . From this fact one can also confi-
dently jump to the characteristic relation between matter and space-time,
which is that extension is the essence of both matter and space-time. We
now ask whether or not relativity theory changes the continuous kinematical
(and dynamical) description. From the perspective of relativity theory, we
leave the notion of absolute space-time and any kind of privileged relation-
ship between matter and space-time. However, it would be deception if one
thought that the notion of "a prior existence of space-time" is accrued from
the notion of "absolute space-time" because the issue is not if there is a prior
existence of space-time on its own right, but how we take it into account
of the description of a physical event. Therefore, whenever one determines
the event in light of the operational definition, one always observes it right
there in space-time from one’s reference frame. This precisely explains why
we describe the dynamics of the event in terms of space-time coordinates. In
addition to this, since we hold the notion of matter to be immune to an ar-
bitrary division of space-time in the context of relativity theory, it is evident
to say that the notion of an operational-based prior existence of space-time
remains valid. In conclusion, we want to point out that relativity theory
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has not changed the conceptual description given above except for the fact
that the geometrical character of space-time is connected with the state of
matter. It is thus important to grasp how a physical event seems through
the windows of these two classical theories. In this case, we define a physical
event in a way that:
(i) it is of an aggregation of matter which is meaningful in term of space-time
coordinates, giving rise to a continuous dynamics of these coordinates;
and
(ii) it is immune to an arbitrary division of space-time coordinates, giving
rise to a continuous kinematical description.
In this picture, a physical event is a passive geometrical structure which re-
acts to its environment through space-time and curiously enough, this point
of view has been retained in the foundations of quantum theory. Neverthe-
less, the mutually exclusive character of the kinematics and dynamics have
been revealed in quantum theory and both Bohr’s complementary argument
and the uncertainty principle have been considered as the declaration of
that mutual exclusivity (see, e.g., [26, 27]). However, the truth is that both
Heisenberg and Bohr had made their comments on the foundation of quan-
tum theory relying upon the classical definition of an event just given above.
While Bohr had reached his complementary principle, the operational defi-
nition had led Heisenberg to remove the notion of orbital from atom theory
and to reach a statistical interpretation of the uncertainty principle [1].
Another conjecture underlying the foundation of physics is that events in
nature can be interpreted, and thus understood, based on a mere two-valued
logic of rational reason, which will be abbreviated hereafter as the fallacy of
rational reason. What we mean here deliberately by term "rational reason"
is that:
(i) it is based on the three fundamental laws of logic which are the principle
of identity, ((∀x)(x = x)), the law of contradiction, (¬(p∧¬p)) and the
law of excluded middle, (p ∨ ¬p); and
(ii) the transitive property of an equivalence relation R is always valid, i.e.,
if pRq and qRr then pRr [28].
We want to rephrase the principle of identity as the reflexive property of the
events, law of contradiction as the impermeable notion of the events and the
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transitive property as the ratio-nal relation of the events which is the cause
of why we use rational reason. The lack of time in the laws and transitive
property serves as the main property of rational reason, which is that the
elements of rational reason have solid distinctive notions, i.e., they conserve
their contents during any logical process. According to the continuous kine-
matical description of physical events, an aggregation of matter is right there
and only right there with immunity to the division of space-time and with-
out referring to any other region of space-time. These properties of events
provide the rational reason for taking them as solid geometrical structures
existing per se at every point of space-time. For the sake of concreteness,
we can see, for example, how such a perception manifests itself on the inter-
pretations of the well-known double-slit experiment. Firstly, one slit is open
and a pattern of electrons is detected on a screen in terms of intensity, say
I1. Next, the other, but not the first, slit is open and the same detection for
electrons is recorded as I2. In the third case, we want to predict the pattern
of the electrons on the screen again in terms of intensity if both slits are
open. According to the conceptualization of rational reason, electrons are an
aggregation of matter residing in space-time, or better said, are passive geo-
metrical structures enclosed by a finite volume of space flowing through time,
and they conserve their (external passive geometrical) character during their
evolution through space-time. Therefore, in the third scenario, the intensity
of the resultant pattern should be a ratio-nal accumulation of those of the
previous scenarios: I3 = I1 + I2. In other words, the constituents (I1 and I2)
already existed in accordance with the continuous kinematical description,
before the existence of the whole (I3), and they constitute the whole as a
synthesis, keeping their physical character. It is crucial to understand how
rational reason achieves this result: (1) according to the reflexive property,
electrons are the same electrons during their evolution; and (2) taking the
continuous kinematical description into account, they satisfy the distinctive
notions of events; and thereby, consequently, (3) they obey the law of the
excluded middle. Under these conditions, it is straightforward to suppose
that:
proposition-1. if the electrons-α pass through the first slit and hit the P-
region of the screen, and
proposition-2. if the electrons-β pass through the second slit and hit the
P-region of the screen then
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result: the intensity I3(P ) at the P-region is electrons-α + electrons-β,
which is a direct implication of the rational relation of events. However, the
double-slit experiment tells us that this implication is not true. The revision
we make in favor of the experiment is to abandon the notion of (point) par-
ticle of electrons and assign them wave-property to explain the result in case
of opening both slits. But when we improve the experiment such that the
electrons are released from the source one by one, we detect each time the
electron as a speck on the screen, from which we surely understand that an
electron is not a kind of ubiquitous wave just like a wave propagating through
the water. As is seen from this example, the concepts of both the continuous
kinematical description and the fallacy of rational reason usually intertwine
in the explanation of any physical event, and thus result in a duality about
the nature of physical events like the wave-particle duality in the double-slit
experiment.
Curiously enough, the authors of the EPR argument [29] also grounded their
physical reality criterion upon continuous kinematical description when they
criticized the completeness of quantum theory. In their paper, the authors
stated the physical reality criterion as such [29]: "if, without in any way dis-
turbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to
one) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical
reality corresponding to this physical quantity (pp. 777)". After the authors
had stated their first inference, they claimed to show that the assumption
of the completeness of Ψ-function, together with the criterion, leads to con-
tradiction. For this purpose, they have first assumed two systems, I and II,
which interact with each other for an interval of time and whose states have
been known before interaction. With the aid of the Schrödinger equation,
they have presented two wave functions of the composite system according to
two observables, A and B, of the first subsystem respectively as the following:
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∞∑
n=1
ψn(x2)µn(x1)
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∞∑
s=1
ϕs(x2)νs(x1),
where x1 and x2 stand for the variables describing the subsystems, and µn(x1)
is the eigenfunction of A with eigenvalue an and νs(x1) of B with eigenvalue
bs. One can take the observable A as the momentum and B as the position
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of the first subsystem. Now, according to the wave packet reduction, if
the observable A is measured and is detected with the value am then, after
measurement, the first system is left in the state µm(x1) and the second
system in the sate ψm(x2). On the other hand, if the observableB is measured
resulting with the value br, then this time the first system is realized in the
state νr(x1) and the second one in the sate ϕr(x2). Bearing in mind that
ψm(x2) is the eigenfunction of the momentum operator and ϕr(x2) of the
position operator of the second system, the authors have made the crucial
comment [29]:
"As a consequence of two measurements performed upon the first
system, the second system may be left in states with two different
wave functions. On the other hand, since at the time of measure-
ment the two systems no longer interact, no real change can take
place in the second system in consequence of anything that may
be done to the first system. This is, of course, merely a statement
of what is meant by the absence of an interaction between the two
systems. Thus, it is possible to assign two different wave
functions (in our example ψm and ϕr) to the same reality
(the second system after the interaction with the first)" (pp. 778)
[boldfaced belonging to us].
We can now give the EPR argument, which is that: (1) having started with
the completeness of Ψ-function, and (2) according to the physical reality cri-
terion, and since (3) (the authors have inferred that) ψm and ϕr represent the
same reality, then one can predict both the momentum and position of the
second system with certainty, and thus, they are real simultaneously. This
would seem to be an appropriate place to shed light on how continuous kine-
matical description has been used in this conclusion. First of all, the physical
reality criterion states that a physical quantity is real and always real if it is
predicted with certainty. This is indeed nothing but only the expression of
the continuous kinematical (or dynamical) description of the physical quanti-
ties. What is more, the two different wave functions, that is ψm and ϕr, have
been assigned to the same reality with the aid of the operational definition,
which again relies on the continuous kinematical description as stated ear-
lier. In the first place, when the observable A is measured and consequently
the second system reduces to the state ψm, it must be assumed that the
momentum of the second system is real and always real. In the second case,
when the observable B is measured and thus the second system falls into
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the state ϕr, similarly the position of the second system must be regarded as
real and always real. This is the background of how the two different eigen-
functions become representations of the same reality. It is also the ground
of locality, which entails that every interaction must be local due to the as-
sumption that every physical entity is some aggregation of matter having a
geometrical structure. We want to emphasize the fact that the two different
eigenfunctions belong to the same reality is not only a direct consequence of
the non-disturbing measurement but also the continuous kinematical descrip-
tion, because there is no way to conclude that, after measurements, both the
eigenfunctions represent the same reality without accepting the continuous
kinematical (and dynamical) description. However, there are, for example,
entangled systems disproving the EPR argument [30]. This is also evidence
against the ground of the physical reality criterion, i.e., the concept of the
continuous kinematical description, and thereby the generality of locality.
2.1. The criticisms of the conjectures and restatement of the physical event
The two conjectures examined above come unavoidable into any descrip-
tion of a physical event because our minds acquire them naturally throughout
our experiences over time. However, as it has been shown above, any descrip-
tion of a physical event relying on these conjectures brings us to a duality
within the nature of the event even though there is no such duality in the
event itself. If indeed there had been, then there would not have been, on
one hand, motion in the view of the kinematical description and realization
of events in the view of the dynamical description on the other hand. After
all, we observe, for example, the emission spectrum of atoms many times and
each time as the same; and we detect the behavior of an electron, for example,
in an electromagnetic field many times and each time, again, as the same.
In addition to these facts, there are also some (side of) events that did not
existed before, but exist now for a time, and will disappear a while later(e.g.
the position of events, the colour of events, etc.). This progress is actually
the necessarily condition for talking about the existent of a physical event.
Therefore, there are factual (and some permanent) events in nature surviv-
ing throughout the physical processes, i.e., with respect to their dynamics.
In this case, we have to remove the continuous kinematical description from
the ground of the expression of a physical event in favor of these factual and
permanent events. The main characteristic property of this description is the
immunity of a physical event to the division of space-time. We should aban-
don this supposition and state that: it is impossible to preserve the notion of
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the factual and permanent events against the arbitrary division of space-time.
The other characteristic property is that a physical event is an aggregation
of matter having meaning in terms of space-time. This supposition forces
us to conclude that a physical event is nothing but an amount of matter
characterized by space-time coordinates. If one goes a step further, the event
seems to be a local entity having a nonfunctional (or passive) geometry. It
was this supposition which allowed us to reach the rational accumulation of
the intensities in the double-slit experiment scenario. Giving wave character
to the electrons is nothing but disproving this supposition because whenever
we append the wave character to the electrons, we destroy at the same time
their nonfunctional geometrical structure, and thereby they gain a functional
geometrical structure, ensuring destructive and constructive inference when
they come into interaction. Therefore, we must also leave this supposition
and should state that: a physical event is a structural form. The term
"structural form" used here signifies a shape whose geometry is both deter-
mined and organized by the structural (or dynamical and physical) properties
of the event; thus, it is the source of the external geometrical shape. Every
physical event has this structural form, which is needed for the objective
reality of the events. Otherwise, one will have to ascribe physical properties
of a physical event to its interaction with its surroundings, which means the
rejection of the objective reality. For example, according to orthodox in-
terpretation of quantum theory, experiments demonstrate whether electrons
behave like particles or waves. This idea implies that the physical properties
of electrons depend on their interaction with their surroundings.
We want to emphasize the fact that a physical event is neither a pure geomet-
rical shape nor a mere accumulation of matter and, by keeping its structural
form, its external geometry is identified by its structural properties which
are functional. Due to their functionality, we call the structural properties
the functional faculties. Now, if one unifies the two statements above, a
physical event obtains a definition with respect to its kinematics, which is
that a physical event is a structural form possessing a finite region of the
space-time. However, this definition is still deficient because it is a kind of
frozen snapshot which does not include the dynamics of the event. If there
is no dynamics, there is no event, and hence no the perception of the event
because the dynamics is the source of the functional faculties of the event.
For instance, it is the dynamics giving existence, and thus meaning, to the
wave property of electrons. To make the dynamics inherent in the nature of
the event, we must give reference to the past and the future of the event.
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This revision then implies that a physical event is not an amount of matter
taking place exactly right there in space-time. Once the event includes the
references to its past and its future, we confront something replaced, that is,
there is something repeating somehow. We do not here synthesize the kine-
matical and the dynamical properties of the event; they are already inherent
in the event. Furthermore, they are not separated in the nature of the event
itself such that one has no reality without the reality of the other. Therefore,
replacement is the existence condition of a physical event. In other words,
replacement is analytic to the nature of a physical event. We can now ask
whether space-time is a physical event or not. It is clear that space-time is
not a physical event because neither space nor time has functional faculties
per se, and they are not observable as bare fact. They are always ascribed to
physical events for explanation. If this is so, do we destroy the unprivileged
relationship between space-time and matter that was stated before? The ab-
sence of a priority between space-time and matter is stated with respect to
the observer, and therefore, it has meaning from the perspective of the oper-
ational definition. However, here we are not observing a physical event but
trying to give it the conception best suited to its concreteness, kinematics
and dynamics. From the perspective of the observer, there is a realized event
and this event appears to the observer as having a finite region of space-time.
Therefore, from the view of the operational definition, there is still no privi-
leged relationship between the (realized) event and space-time. Thereby, we
conclude that space-time is the mode (or condition) of our observation, not
the condition in which the physical event survives.
According to this revised description of the physical event, can we still pre-
serve the character of the rational reason? Since we put away the view of a
physical event being a passive geometrical structure, we cannot preserve the
impermeable notion of the event, that is, we cannot apply the law of contra-
diction any more in general. Whenever, for example, an electron interacts
with another one, the electron does not preserve its geometrical structure
during the interaction due to interference. This is why the linear summa-
tion of intensities is not valid but that of the probability amplitudes is valid.
Therefore, the law of contradiction should be restricted, at least in the scale
of elementary particles. In addition, as pointed out earlier, the lack of time
in the propositions of logic is crucial in the logical process of the rational rea-
son. It is the lack of time, for example, which allows us to think that, if the
momentum of a physical event is real by predicting with certainty then it is
always real (in the lapse of time). Thus, in order to stay consistent with the
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nature of physical events, we should state the propositions about the events
as the function of time, if, for example, they are related to the dynamics of
the events. Finally, the current rational reason is based on the continuous
kinematical description and does not include the dynamical character of the
events. However, the kinematics of physical events has no meaning without
their dynamics, as stated above. Therefore, a revision of the current basis
of rational reason is naturally needed. For such a purpose, new logical sys-
tems have been offered by taking the dynamical properties of the events into
account [31, 32].
3. The conceptual frame for the foundation of the quantum theory
Our main concept is the physical event, which has been derived in the
criticisms of the conjectures such that: it is a replaced structural form pos-
sessing a finite region of space-time. Without losing this definition, one can
now stand as an observer inside the event and seek how a physical event
appears. First of all, from the reference frame of the observer outside the
event, observing a physical event means that the structural form is a real-
ization having a finite space-time. Therefore, we, as an observer outside the
event, always observe the structural form which has become realized. Sec-
ondly, taking into account the replacement character of the structural form,
and if we stay with the realized structural form as an observer inside the
event, we recognize that:
(i) A physical event is the result of the realization of a structural form having
dynamical properties which are about realizing itself. We call this
aspect not-yet realized (in short, NY-Realized), referring to the past of
the event.
(ii) At the same time, a physical event is the source of the subsequent real-
ization of the structural form having now kinematical properties. We
call this aspect not-anymore realized (in short, NA-Realized), referring
to the future of the event.
This is the general conceptual frame of the physical event, and we have de-
picted it in Fig.1. However, this concept still does not fulfill the requirement
of those events being subject to physical science, because the investigation of
a physical event in the context of physics is possible only if some invariant(s)
is (are) inherent in its dynamical nature such as the conservation of energy
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Figure 1: In this figure, we take place on the realized structural form of the physical
event which has the region of space-time (x0, t0), and we try to perceive the event without
losing its given definition. In this case, we recognize, for example, a moving physical
object such that it is the realized structural form with both definite momentum variable
and unspecified position variable (NY-Realized aspect), and at the same time it is the
source of subsequent realization of the structural form with both definite position variable
and unspecified momentum variable (NA-Realized aspect). We attribute to NY-Realized
aspect the pair of the dynamical variables {X(ti), P0(ti)} in order, and to NA-Realized
aspect {P (tj), X0(tj)} in order. The dynamical variables X and P correspond to the
position variable and the momentum variable, respectively.
and momentum. Hence, if we restrict the physical events to those of physics,
an exhaustive and comprehensive definition of a physical event can be given
as follows:
Definition 1. A physical event is an invariant replaced structural form,
possessing a finite region (or extension) of space-time.
The picture given in Fig.1 can be considered also for this definition. Ignoring
the time dynamical variable, we describe, as an example for the sake of con-
creteness, the motion of a physical event (object) as follows. It seems from
the perspective of the NA-Realized that the dynamical variable momentum
has to be determined so that the evolution of the structural form should
result in the present (realized) state of the physical event, that is, the space-
time localization, (x0, t0) which is the possessed region of the space-time of
the (realized) event. Therefore, we attribute to the NY-Realized aspect the
pair of dynamical variable {X,P0} in order, where subscript "0" shows the
determined character of P . Similarly, from the perspective of NA-Realized,
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this present (realized) structural form should be the source of the subsequent
realization of the structural form such that it has a specified position variable
with an unspecified momentum variable. Thus, we reasonably attribute to
the NY-Realized aspect the pair of the dynamical variable {P,X0} in order,
where the subscript "0" shows the determined character of X. We will return
to this point when arguing the uncertainty principle.
Without losing the general scope of quantum theory, energy conservation can
be taken as the general invariant inherent in the nature of physical events.
Hence, the two aspects of the physical event are interconnected with energy
conservation. One can characterize this invariant by a variational principle.
The NA-Realized and NY-Realized aspects of a physical event reveal nat-
urally the non-commutative character of the evolution of a physical event.
The justification of this interpretation can be seen in terms of Liouville’s
equation:
dA
dt
= ∂A
∂t
+ 1
i~
[A,H],
where A is a physical variable. Indeed, if the physical variable does not ex-
plicitly depend on time, then its evolution manifests itself according to the
invariant of the event, that is, Hamiltonian of the event, which consists of
the non-commutativity character.
In the scope of quantum theory, what concept can be attributed to this no-
tion of the structural form? Our first requirement is that it should unify
the dynamical and kinematical perspective of the physical event in itself. In
other words, both the NY-Realized and NA-Realized aspects of the structural
form should merge into the concept in such a way that the structural form
preserves its unity. Our second requirement is that the concept not force
us to the continuous kinematical description. Because, according to this de-
scription as stated in Sec.2, a physical event is meaningful only in terms of
space-time coordinates (x0, t0), and it is immune to the indefinite division of
space-time. This approach, in addition to giving an operational definition to
the event, forces us to consider that the event is a continuous kinematical and
dynamical realization of an aggregation of matter, which results in a duality
in the nature of the event. Furthermore, from the window of this approach,
the dynamical and kinematical properties of the physical event have to be
real in the course of a continuous evolution. However, this induction con-
tradicts with the fundamental principle of quantum theory, that is, Planck’s
hypothesis that the absorption and emission of energy are discontinuous.
Therefore, we have to refrain from such a continuous realization of the physi-
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cal properties of the event. It then seems that one of the possible candidates
satisfying these two requirements is the density matrix of a quantum system.
Indeed, one can represent the density matrix in the different representations
(or descriptions) which have the same eigenvalues, and these representations
are connected to each other with a unitary transformation[33]. As is well
known, the space of the position variable is connected to the space of the
momentum variable by Fourier transformation, that is, a unitary transfor-
mation. Hence, the invariant replaced structural form can be interpreted as
the density matrix of the event, which is also the quantum state.
We now proceed to embed the eigenstates and eigenvalues of physical observ-
ables into this picture from a ontological perspective. It has been customary
to interpret the eigenvalues as the only realized values of the corresponding
observables [4, 34]. In other words, a physical operator realizes itself only in
one of these eigenvalues. It is obvious that this is an imposition of the mea-
surement perspective. However, we have stated before that the measurement
perspective relies on the operational definition, which is fraught with the con-
jectures given in Sec.2. For this reason, in addition to other evidence such
as the polarization of light, we reject this interpretation. In the case of the
polarization of light, we assume a monochromatic plane wave moving to the
positive z-direction and being polarized in the xy-plane by making an angle
θ in the x-direction. We measure the intensity of the wave at various values
by means of an analyzer according to how its optical axis is positioned. If its
optical axis makes the same angle as that of the wave, we then measure the
intensity in full. This means that the components of the polarization of light
along the x-direction and y-direction manifested themselves simultaneously
as a whole in the measurement. Therefore, to comprehend such situations
in the picture, the eigenvalues of an observable should not be interpreted
according to the measurement perspective. Instead, they are the contents of
the possible eigenstates which can be entitled as modes. Hence, we can make
the following definition for the eigenvalues:
Definition 2. The eigenvalues of a physical observable are the contents of
the modes of the observable contained in the structural form .
According to this definition, an invariant replaced structural form can contain
a superposition of the eigenstates, and thus, the eigenvalues of an observable.
This definition is compatible with the reality of a physical event[21]. Similar
to the polarization of light, for example, the superposition of the modes of
the spin operator Sz with equal weight gives new modes either along the
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x-direction or y-direction.
From this perspective, the functionality of dynamical variables imposes itself
as a fact inherent in the structural form. This is the specific behavior of dy-
namical variables, for instance, the vectorial behavior. As another example,
the functionality of energy enables the destructive and instructive inferences
of electrons. Thus, we cannot assume physical objects, just like an aggre-
gation of matter having a passive geometrical shape. The modes contained
in the invariant replaced structural form determine, for example, both the
energy extension and its functionality when the structural form becomes real-
ized. This conclusion is consistent with the interpretation of the energy-time
uncertainty presented in Refs. [35, 36]. As a special area of physical events,
we can ask what the physical objects are, in particular, the elementary par-
ticles like protons and electrons. The permanent and stable existence of the
elementary particles is their main character. Definition 1 of a physical event
tells us that the elementary particles are an invariant replaced structural
form having a finite region (or extension) of space-time. In addition, if we
look at Planck hypothesis, E = hv ⇒ E = h/T ⇒ ET = h, it seems that
the realization of the energy, or equivalently, a complete replacement of the
structural form needs a finite time interval which has already been stated in
definition 1. Indeed, the hypothesis is a counter-factual declaration of phys-
ical events against the continuous kinematical description. According to the
hypothesis, we can interpret the frequency as the quantitative determination
of energy. In addition, since the extended energy of the structural form can-
not be "nothing", the space occupied by the (realized) structural form cannot
also be arbitrarily small without losing the (realized) structural form. it is
now clear that an elementary particle can be defined as follows:
Definition 3. An elementary particle is a permanent wave packet, or equiv-
alently, a permanent frequency packet such that its energy extension is defined
by its frequency which is a superposition of the modes of the energy contained
in the invariant replaced structural form. In short, if v is the frequency corre-
sponding to the finite time that is needed for the realization of the energy, then
an elementary particle is a uniform constantly replacement of the structural
form with the frequency v.
This definition is consistent with the general form of the wave packet in the
literature, which is ψ(q, t) = A(x, t)exp(iS(q, t)/~). The extended energy as
the realization of structural form is not a mode of the energy observable,
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but is the superposition of the modes contained in the structural form. Fur-
thermore, since the replacement of the structural form emerges according to
the invariant, that is, the conservation of energy, then the realization of the
structural form should be characterized by the trace function such that:
Definition 4. Realization of a structural form is trace of the invariant,
Tr(Hρ) = 〈E〉, where density matrix ρ plays the role of the structural form.
According to this definition, the extended energy as the realization of the
structural form is the expectation value of the energy variable; thus, we can
reinterpret Planck’s hypothesis in context of the realization of the invariant
replaced structural form again, like 〈E〉T = h, for an elementary particle.
The time appearing in this reinterpretation is the finite time needed for a
complete realization of the structural form. In other words, it is the finite
time possessed by a physical event, which was stated in definition 1 of the
event.
This conceptual frame is sufficient to merge the main questions, presented in
the introduction, into a consistent interpretation. They were these: i) what is
the physical status of the uncertainty principle?, and ii) what is the physical
status of the quantum state? We have already determined the physical status
of the quantum state (i.e., density matrix) as the invariant replaced structural
form expressed in definition 1. Now, we wish to express how the uncertainty
principle plays a role in the structural form. To this aim, we focus on the pic-
ture given in Fig.1. We have described that: (i) from the perspective of the
NY-Realized, a physical event is the result of the realization of an invariant
replaced structural form having a determined momentum on the one hand;
and at the same time, (ii) from the perspective of the NA-Realized, it is the
source of the subsequent realization of the invariant replaced structural form
having a determined position, on the other hand. A determined variable can
be represented, in general, by a positive operator-valued measure (POVM).
We have attributed to the former perspective the pair of the dynamical vari-
ables {X,P0} in order, and to the latter the pair of the dynamical variables
{P,X0} in order. If these two variables were compatible with each other,
then their orders would seem exactly the same from both perspectives, that
is, they would be {X0, P0} and {P0, X0}, respectively, from the description
perspective. In other words, they would become realized compatibly (or si-
multaneously). However, according to the description of the physical event,
this is impossible. This impossibility should be read as a counter-factual
declaration of physical events against the continuous dynamical description.
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During a complete replacement, the structural form unifies in itself both per-
spectives according to its invariant. This unification happens by means of a
unitary transformation. Therefore, we conclude that the uncertainty between
the position and momentum variables arises as a physical character of the
invariant replacement of the structural form. In short, contrary to common
sense[13], the uncertainty is not due to the measurement but is ontologi-
cal. This idea does not exclude measurement error, but rather, it implies
a universal measurement error within incompatible measurements. In other
words, it implies that, independent of measurement, there is no simultaneous
continuous kinematical and dynamical description of a physical event if we
do not want to lose the notion of factual and permanent events. One can read
the second term on the right side of the Robertson-Schrödinger inequality
[37, 38],
∆X2∆P 2 ≥ Cov
2(X,P )
4 +
|〈[X,P ]〉|2
4
as the ontological uncertainty entering into the measurement error.
How does the measurement seem from this conceptual frame? In the first
place, we underline the fact that an observation is an action of the ob-
server from a reference frame outside a physical event. This means that
the observer tries to observe the realization of the structural form, i.e.,
Tr(Hρ) = 〈E〉. In the second place, if the observer attempts to learn the
content of the structural form, the observer first interacts with the event
by means of an experiment and then observes the realization of the event.
Therefore, taking {Πk, k ∈ I} as a set of POVMs, one measurement is the
realization Tr(HΠiρ); thus, the measurement process is inherently statisti-
cal. In addition, if we would present the density matrix of a physical event
as ρ = ∑i pi |ψi〉 〈ψi|, where the pure states {|ψi〉} are not necessarily orthog-
onal, then we would describe the state of the event statistically because this
density matrix is a mixture of reality (the sates {|ψi〉}) and the observer’s
lack of information (the probabilities pi) about the structural form of the
event. However, the structural form of a physical event in itself is a pure
state because if it is not a pure state then it does not have an invariant which
unifies the kinematical and dynamical perspective of the event. In short, a
physical event does not have two different structural forms simultaneously.
Furthermore, if the states {|ψi〉} are not orthogonal then we cannot apply the
law of excluded middle categorically to the interaction of the event with its
environment because the notions (the states) are not distinct (orthogonal).
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4. Conclusion
We have presented the uncertainty principle and the quantum state as
two essential problems of quantum theory. We have resolved the problems
on the ground of a unification of the kinematical and dynamical characters
of physical events and then unified them as an invariant replaced structural
form. We wish to underline the result that the uncertainty between the po-
sition and momentum variables is inherent in the nature of the structural
form. An understanding of the nature of this structural form requires the
revision of the ratio-nal reason. Because the current ratio-nal reason is based
on the operational definition, which relies on the continuous kinematical de-
scription, which always forces us to determine the content of a physical event
from the perspective of the operational definition by means of abstract con-
cepts. We need a new logic to unearth the content of the structural form
(see, for example [31, 32]).
Another important result of our conceptual frame is that space-time is cre-
ated as a result of the realization of the invariant replaced the structural
form. This does not contradict with the results of relativity theory about
space-time because relativity theory determines a physical event from an op-
erational perspective; in other words, its object is not the structural form ρ
but the realization of the structural form, Tr(Hρ), which has an inborn finite
space-time region. One can design an experiment to measure this finite time
of realization [39]. Therefore, the absence of privilege between the matter
and space-time is preserved from the operational perspective.
The notion of a (one) complete replacement of structural form in our con-
ceptual frame supports the possibility of a time operator[40] having a do-
main [0, 2pi], which is another result of our conceptual frame. The time
parameter-t used in classical mechanics is based on the perspective of the
operational definition which has a domain (−∞,∞). However, treating this
time parameter-t as a canonical variable is fraught with dynamical problems
such as the impossibility of finding a Hamiltonian for the enlarged system
consisting of the time as the (n+1)th canonical coordinate [41].
The most remarkable result of our conceptual frame is that a physical event,
as an invariant replaced structural form, has a functional nature; in other
words, it is not an accumulation of matter with a passive geometrical shape,
but it is an active shape such that its dynamical properties organize in unity,
the so called structural form. These organized dynamical properties man-
ifest themselves by means of the invariant. Two aspects, NY-Realized and
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NA-Realized, of the structural form suggest a non-commutative geometry
as long as one considers microscopical scale of physical events. The reason
behind the need for non-commutative geometry is related to the following
question: why do the things around us seem as if they are continuous and
stable objects? If one considers a motionless object having 1gr mass and
attains, for the sake of simplicity, the Hamiltonian mc2I, then its realization
is Tr(mc2Iρ) = mc2 = 〈E〉. The time needed for a complete realization of
the object is T = h/〈E〉 ≈ 10−39sec. This explains why the things around us
seem continuous, and as passive and stable geometrical objects. In this ex-
ample, we assumed the motionless object as an aggregation of matter having
a passive geometrical structure, which means that the structure of the object
is non-functional. Therefore, non-commutativity is about whether or not the
functional faculties of a physical event manifest their functional character.
If the realization period of a physical event and the interaction time of the
event with its environment are at the same scale, we then observe the effect
of the functional character of the variables.
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